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Observations on the State of Shareholder Participation in
Corporate Governance
Barbara Leventhal
Securities and Exchange Commission*
I was very pleased to receive Professor Stettler's invitation to speak to you
tonight about corporate governance. T h e subject is a timely and fascinating
one, with more serious implications for the accounting profession than are
generally recognized. In an obvious sense, there is a direct relationship between
the structure and composition of corporate boards and the ability of auditors to
maintain their independence. T h i s relationship has been acknowledged by
Congress, the Commission, and the profession. It is well established, as was
noted by the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities last January, that "[t]he
board of directors, with outside members and an audit committee when appropriate, is the best vehicle for achieving and maintaining balance i n the relationship between the independent auditor and management." More recently,
the A I C P A has demonstrated its agreement w i t h this proposition by considering whether there is a need for independent audit committees as a condition
for an independent audit.
Other Calls for Reform
Less obvious perhaps but equally significant is the direct parallel between
the issues facing the accounting profession and those facing the corporate community. In both cases perceived problems and a decline i n public confidence
have given rise to Congressional concern and calls for reform. Radical but
similar solutions, such as federal licensing of accountants and federal chartering
of companies have been suggested. The question which must be answered i n
both cases is not whether change must come but how it w i l l come—and whether
the solutions w i l l be supplied by the private sector or whether they w i l l be
imposed by government.
In recent months, there has been an incredible amount of activity i n the
field of corporate governance. In addition to the Commission's re-examination
of its rules relating to shareholder communications, shareholder participa* The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility
for any private publications by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of
the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's
colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
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tion i n the corporate electoral process, and corporate governance generally, corporate accountability projects have been announced by the F T C and the Department
of Commerce. Following hearings held last summer by the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies, Senator
Metzenbaum has appointed an advisory committee to make recommendations
relating to the need for federal m i n i m u m standards legislation. A working
group of that committee is scheduled to report back to Senator Metzenbaum
within the next six weeks. In the private sector, the American Bar Association,
the American L a w Institute, the Business Roundtable, the American Assembly
and other organizations have undertaken a variety of corporate governance
projects. Rarely does a week go by without an article appearing i n some major
publication on this subject. Graduate students are gathering on my doorstep i n
droves for assistance i n researching their corporate governance theses, and if
that were not evidence enough of a national movement, several weeks ago the
N e w Y o r k Times published an editorial calling for the word "governance" to
be stricken from the English language because of its pretentiousness and overuse.
Dissatisfaction w i t h Corporate Governance
W h i l e the scope and focus of the various corporate governance projects
differ, the projects all reflect a certain uneasiness or dissatisfaction w i t h the
way i n w h i c h large modern corporations function. T h i s dissatisfaction is not
economic, for it is widely acknowledged even by critics that the corporate
sector has performed well i n providing goods, services, jobs and investment
returns. Rather, there is a public perception that corporations have become vast
aggregations of unchecked political and economic power w i t h the capacity to
do grave harm to society. Recent events, including widespread illegal conduct,
mistreatment of consumers and shareholders, self-dealing, and misuse of corporate
funds for personal gain have led many divergent groups to conclude that a
problem exists and that the time has come to re-examine the checks and balances,
internal and external, that regulate corporate conduct and to reconsider the
basic questions about the role and responsibilities of the corporations i n society.
A s the staff member i n charge of the Commission's corporate governance
hearings, I have spent a substantial portion of the last year immersed i n governance questions.
It is from this background that I draw the following comments on the status
of that proceeding and offer you some personal observations.
T h e Hearings on Corporate Governance
In a release issued last A p r i l , the Commission announced its intention to
re-examine its rules relating to shareholder communications, shareholder participation i n the corporate electoral process, and corporate governance generally.
T h e decision to undertake this study was based on the fact that recent events,
such as the numerous corporate disclosures concerning questionable and illegal
payments, had served to focus public attention on the subject of corporate accountability and raised questions about the adequacy of existing checks and
balances related to corporate management. These events underscored the con128

cerns expressed many years ago by Berle and Means that the theoretical corporate
governance model is a myth i n the context of a large publicly held corporation.
They asserted that directors who are chosen by management do not effectively
monitor management conduct, and furthermore, since elections of directors
are most often mere ratifications of management's slates, directors are not
answerable to shareholders through the electoral process.
T h e Securities and Exchange Commission was granted a broad Congressional mandate under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange A c t to make
rules i n connection with the solicitation of proxies w h i c h are necessary or appropriate i n the public interest or for the protection of investors for the purpose
of assuring fair corporate suffrage. Relative to this mandate, the Commission
was concerned that existing regulations might not provide shareholders adequate
opportunities to participate meaningfully i n corporate governance or the corporate
electoral process. T h e Commission noted that shareholders generally receive
limited information about certain significant corporate policies and practices on
matters not submitted to shareholders for their approval, and that shareholders
have limited access to corporate proxy machinery. Election contests are rarely
feasible because of the huge expenses involved, and the right to make nominations at annual meetings is of little practical significance, since at that point
proxies have already been received by management and the number of shareholders attending an annual meeting typically is small. Despite the breadth of
the Commission's existing authority, it recognized that a number of questions,
such as the fundamental question of how corporations can best be made more
responsive to their shareholders and the public at large, transcended the proxy
rules i n significance and that some methods of obtaining greater accountability
could not be achieved within the present statutory framework. Comments therefore were requested on the desirability of Commission support for federal legislation, such as a bill establishing m i n i m u m federal standards of corporate
conduct and shareholders' rights.
T h e preliminary stages of the re-examination consisted of a request for
public comments and the holding of public hearings on a variety of issues
relating to corporate governance and corporate responsibility. W h i l e too numerous to mention i n detail here, these issues fell into three categories—
• T h e adequacy of existing avenues of communication between shareholder and corporations, and particularly, whether shareholders should
be provided w i t h more information than is now available w i t h respect to socially significant matters affecting their corporations. A l s o
involved was whether Rule 14a-8 regarding shareholder proposals,
should be amended to further facilitate the presentation of shareholder
views and concerns i n the corporate proxy materials.
• T h e role of the shareholders i n the corporate electoral process and
whether the Commission should amend its proxy rules to provide
shareholders access to corporate proxy materials for the purpose of
nominating persons of their choice to serve on the board of directors.
• Whether additional disclosure relevant to an assessment of the quality
and integrity of management should be required, such as information
relating to the existence and composition of corporate nominating
committees, the existence of business and personal relationships be129

tween nominees or their affiliates and the board, time spent on corporate affairs by incumbents, directors resignations and reasons therefor, and more detailed or comprehensive disclosure of management
remuneration and transactions.
Related questions, such as the appropriate role of the self-regulatory organizations i n improving corporate governance through revisions of their listing
requirements, the perceived costs and benefits of various changes, and the need
for revisions i n the format of proxy cards were also considered.
Public Hearings Response
T h e response of the public to the Commission's request for input was encouraging. In total, more than three hundred persons and organizations i n cluding corporations, business associations, government officials, public interest
and religious groups, law firms, bar associations, financial analysts, academics,
accountants, and individuals submitted written comments or testified during
the five weeks of public hearings. So voluminous were the materials offered to
the Commission, i n fact, that the staff spent the winter fighting through masses
of paper, attempting to draw some conclusions from the array of comments and
proposals presented.
W h i l e the paper war is not quite over, we are beginning to see the light at
the end of the tunnel. Shortly, the staff intends to present a concept paper to
the Commission and seek authorization to develop a number of rule proposals
for publication. The staff is also preparing an extensive report for publication
which w i l l present, i n excruciating detail, a summary of the information contained i n the record of this proceeding along w i t h staff analysis and recommendations concerning the various issues under study.
Emerging Trends
A l t h o u g h our final tally has not been completed, a few general trends have
emerged from the record. First, while a number of commentators believe that
the present system is working well and that corporations are fulfilling their economic functions i n a satisfactory manner, there is a growing recognition that
the old notion that corporate responsibility is limited to returning a profit is
obsolete, and that new accountability mechanisms are necessary. There is also
an increasing awareness that regardless of the adequacy of existing checks and
balances or the degree to which corporate accountability has broken down, there
is a public perception that problems exist amid a decreasing level of confidence
i n corporations by shareholders and consumers. T h i s lack of confidence has
obvious implications for the ability of companies to raise capital i n the future.
Second, although there is a widely held perception that both individual and
institutional investors are passive "creditors" of a company more interested i n
that company's income stream than i n playing an active ownership role i n corporate affairs, it is clear that these investors are becoming increasingly concerned
w i t h certain corporate policies and expressing growing frustration about their
inability to influence management decisions. W h i l e major financial institutions
are still somewhat squeamish about using their voting power to influence man130

agement decisions, individual shareholders, universities, church groups and
pension funds are showing less hesitation to politicize the corporate electoral
process.
T h i r d , there is clearly growing, although by no means unanimous, support
for a number of proposals designed to give shareholders more information i n
proxy statements and to provide them with added opportunities to participate
in the corporate electoral process.
Boards of Directors as a Focal Point
Although a large number of proposals were made regarding ways i n which
corporate accountability could be improved, and it would be simplistic to suggest
that any one of them was supported by the majority of commentators, we d i d
encounter substantial support for the notion that the key to improved corporate
governance is the evolution of stronger, more independent boards of directors.
Various means to strengthen boards were suggested, including the creation of
increased opportunities for shareholder input into the electoral process, the adoption of S E C disclosure requirements which would stimulate structural changes,
encouraging the voluntary establishment of nominating committees and the
inclusions of more independent, nonaffiliated outsiders on the board, and the
enactment of legislation specifying the fiduciary obligations of directors and
officers and providing certain shareholder rights, redressable i n federal court.
A more drastic legislative solution, involving federal chartering of corporations,
also was advocated by a small number of witnesses. However, the concept of
establishing constituency boards, an integral part of federal chartering, proved
to be extremely unpopular.
N o t surprisingly, the business community expressed a strong preference for
voluntary action i n lieu of the more heavy-handed approaches, citing i n support
of this position, the many encouraging developments and innovations which
have been adopted by companies i n recent years, such as the establishment of
audit and other standing committees, the inclusion of more outsiders on the
board, voluntary disclosure, and improved shareholder communication programs.
Other more skeptical witnesses suggested that these so-called voluntary changes
have occurred only i n response to governmental prodding, and that reliance on
voluntarism would not result i n meaningful reform.
W h i l e it is clear that there is no one answer to the numerous issues which
have been raised, m y own view is that the commentators who stressed the i m portance of the role of the board of directors i n monitoring corporate conduct
and improving corporate accountability are correct. T h e evolution of stronger,
more independent boards w i t h a broader understanding of the long term social
and economic responsibilities of the modern corporation and an ability to truly
represent the shareholders, monitor management performance, and approve
major policies would appear to be the most effective means of m a k i n g corporations
more accountable. Moreover, whether or not one agrees w i t h the recent suggestion of Chairman W i l l i a m s that boards be composed entirely of independent
outsiders w i t h the exception of the chief executive officer and that the C E O not
serve as chairman of the board, it seems to me to be indisputable that independent
directors, who are neither employees of the corporation nor providers of profes131

sional or business services, are more able to ask the probing questions that must
be asked of management. Given adequate compensation, adequate information,
and an adequate understanding of their responsibilities, such boards should be
well equipped to perform their function.
A u d i t committees composed entirely of independent directors w i t h direct
access to the outside and internal auditors and prescribed duties covering all
facets of the audit process obviously are desirable, although as was demonstrated
in the National Telephone Case, the existence of an audit committee is meaningless absent an understanding of committee responsibilities and procedures to
perform them. I look forward w i t h interest to the A I C P A ' s recommendations
in this regard. Similarly, nominating committees which do not include any
management directors should strengthen the effectiveness of boards by reducing
the indebtedness felt by nominees to the C E O and expanding the universe of
candidates from which board members are chosen. Compensation committees
are yet another promising accountability tool, if properly constituted. T a k e n
together, the effect of these structural reforms should be to restore, at least i n
part, the validity of the theoretical model of corporate governance under which
management is answerable to the board.
These propositions are of course i n no way novel. They are widely espoused
by large segments of the business community and government. Recently a no
less radical publication than Business Week called for the election of genuine
shareholder representatives as board members i n place of the crony system which
now prevails. T h e only real question is how reforms w i l l be achieved.
Effecting Needed Reforms
O n this point, it is clear that the easiest and quickest method of effecting
change either would be for each corporation to adopt structural reforms voluntarily and immediately or for Congress to mandate such change. I do not believe
the former is likely to happen, and the latter, while conceivable at some point
i n the future, has a number of serious disadvantages, including the stifling effect
it is likely to have on innovation and experimentation. Somewhere between these
two extremes I believe that a number of interesting possibilities exist.
It seems to me that there are several alternatives available to the S E C
w i t h i n its existing statutory authority which would foster an environment of
greater accountability. T h e adoption of disclosure requirements which provide
more information about the quality of management and the structure, composition, and functions of the board and its committees would serve to encourage
improvements i n corporate governance and would provide investors w i t h information vital to an assessment of management. O f particular importance, i n my
view, is expanded information about the business and personal relationships
between board members or nominees and the corporation; information about committees and about director resignations and the reasons therefore; and disclosure
about directors fees, indemnification arrangements, and an indication of the
number of meetings attended. Changes i n the listing requirements of self
regulatory organizations also seem to warrant further attention. Additionally,
the continued articulation of directors' responsibilities, both through reports of
investigation and the issuance of "white papers" or guidelines could be fruitful.
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Similarly, some expansion of the role of shareholders i n the corporate electoral
process, such as the adoption of a rule permitting shareholder nominations i n
corporate proxy materials, i n m y view, would provide a safety valve for expressions of deep-seated dissatisfaction with management performance. Despite the
fact that such a procedure would not affect board composition or the outcome
of corporate elections i n the majority of cases, it could increase the chances of
including true shareholder representatives on boards which have not been responsive to investor concerns, particularly where institutional holders are stimulated to use their voting power.
These proposals would not cause any drastic changes nor are they meant to.
Instead, it is to be hoped that the alternative I have described would provide a
stimulus for evolution of better governance procedures and a heightened level
of awareness among corporate leaders of the responsibilities which the public
expects them to meet.
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